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INFRINGEMENT OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS:

CASE STUDIES IN THE
FIELD OF PATENTS-*

By: Justice Alfredo L Benipayo **

WITH THE advent of globalization as a reality, the formerly utopic dream of the entire world as one common market *sans frontieres* has been revealed to have an equally real, but darker, side -dystopic shadow cast by the emerging World Economy.

As in other, more mundane, circumstances, the world market faces the challenge of an underground economy which flourishes beneath the surface of legality, just beyond the reach of the rules and regulation governing legitimate enterprise.

One of the vital foundations - certainly among the main sources of liquidity - of this underground eco-

nomy is the illegitimate use of the intellectual property of others, particularly in the fields of patents. In this connection, I wish to discuss some Philippine case studies in this field, focusing on patent infringements.

As is so often said now, we must think globally and act locally. Thus, keeping in mind the general principles of intellectual property infringement drawn in broad strokes by the TRIPs Agreement, we would do well to familiarize ourselves with the milieu our discussion must, perforce, inhabit.

A little bit of history, then.

The protection of intellectual property rights in the Philippines has had a relatively long history, dating back to 1947 when Republic Act 165 - the Patents Law - went into effect.

Some twenty years later, Presidential Decree 1236 amended RA 165, giving the Patents Law a much needed brushing up, to keep it abreast with the exigencies of the times. In 1987, Executive Order 133 merged the formerly separate Phil-

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ippine Patent Office with the Technology Transfer Board, and came up with the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer. A rather unwieldy name with an unwieldy acronym: BPTTT.

In 1993, realizing perhaps the need for greater coordination between the intellectual property rights protection agencies, EO60 created the Inter-Agency Committee on Intellectual Property Rights (IAC-IPR), under the Office of the President.

Finally, in 1997 Congress promulgated RA 8293 - the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines which took effect on January 1, 1998. The IPC not merely codified the various IPR protection laws in force up until its emergence, but contained a number of innovations on the old laws.

In the field of Patents, the most significant changes involved a shift from the "first-to-invent" system, under the old Patents Law, to the "first-to-file" mode under the IPC.

In the case of inventions, the period of the grant now runs 20 years from the date of filing instead of the 17 years under RA 165, while utility models are now protected for only 7 years without renewal instead of 5 years with 5-year renewals.

As far as penalties go, repetition of infringement is now meted the penalty of 100 thousand pesos to 300 thousand pesos and/or 6 months to

3 years imprisonment. This change reflects a recognition of the extent of economic damage infringement causes. Moreover, the offense now prescribes only after 3 years instead of 2j thus giving the property right holders more opportunity to go after the infringers

That brings us up to now, and segues me into telling you that the IPC, as young as it is, has not yet been tried at the Bar of Justice. As recently as February of 1998, the latest Patents case disposed of by the Supreme Court found resolution under the provisions of the old Patents Law.

In any case, apart from the changes I've mentioned already, and a few other procedural changes, the Patents provisions of the IPC do not clash with those of RA 165. Certainly, the same fundamental principles apply, and given the same bases and conceptual framework within which to analyze a given patents problem, logic will inevitably carry us to the same results

The prosecution of patent infringements can be - and often are - highly technical affairs, highly resistant to easy comprehension. You certainly wouldn't want to read patents cases for relaxation. However, as complicated as they may be, the resolution of patents cases follow a predictable pattern which begins with the fundamental question: Does the patent validly exist?

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The answer to this query is the bedrock upon which all subsequent developments are built.

A patent is, in essence, a recognition of the patent-holder's exclusive right to manufacture, utilize and profit from his brainchild. "Infringement" thus refers to the unauthorized making, using, or selling of the patented invention of another, during the life of his valid patent. As the law puts it, it is "the making, using, offering for sale, selling or importing a patented product or a product obtained directly or indirectly from a patented process, or the use of a patented process without the authorization of the patentee" (Sec. 76, IPC).

Thus, without the patent, there really is no exclusive right to speak of; there being no right, it would be impossible to contemplate infringement of any sort, much less prosecution for the violation of any right which does not even really exist to be protected.

Once it has been determined that the exclusive rights to an invention exist, and a patent has been issued to guarantee the preservation of those rights, the question that needs to be answered becomes: *Has there been an infringement?*

This question obviously goes to the very *raison d'etre* of the prosecution. Determination of this issue may be had by either of two means: the test of literal infringement, or the

doctrine of equivalents.

Literal infringement calls for the determination of the fact of violation based on the words of the claim itself, i.e., what the patent holder expressly declares ought to be his exclusively. If the alleged infringing contrivance clearly falls within the bounds of the claim, then the fact of infringement is proven with no need for further evidence or discussion.

When this test fails, the doctrine of equivalents gets pressed into the service.

This, then, shall be our conceptual framework for this afternoon and our discussion will focus along the lines I have just drawn.

DOES THE PATENT VALIDLY EXIST?

Answering this question requires the resolution of two "prejudicial" questions: first, *Is the invention patentable?*; and second, *In case more than one inventor lays claim to the invention, who has the better right to the patent?*

Is the invention patentable?

According to both the IPC and the old Patents Law, a patentable invention is "any technical solution of a problem in any field of human activity which is new, involves an inventive step, and is industrially applicable... It may be, or may relate to a product, or process, or an improvement of any of the foregoing."

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From this, we glean the three fundamental elements of invention:

- a) novelty, or newness such that the invention has never before been available to the public nor has ever formed part of a prior art;
- b) the inventive step which refers to the intellectual leap beyond the confines of an existing contrivance or artifice; and
- c) industrial applicability, which pretty much speaks for itself.

It is upon these three criteria that the final determination, of whether a patent validly exists or not, depends. Failing in any of these tests, an alleged invention cannot be granted a patent, or if already given one, must be stripped of that protection.

In fact, all three questions of novelty, the inventive step, and industrial applicability were addressed by the court in the case of *Conrado de Leon v. Domiciano A. Aguas and F. H. Aquino & Sons* (GR. No. L-32160, January 30, 1982).

In this case, the plaintiff, de Leon, held Letters Patent for his invention to certain new and useful improvements in the process of making mosaic pre-cast tiles. De Leon had earlier disclosed to defendant F.H. Aquino, an engraver, certain specifications for the engraving of a mold, which de Leon had used to manufacture his

mosaic pre-cast tiles. De Leon had earlier disclosed to defendant F.H. Aquino, an engraver, certain specifications for the engraving of a mold which de Leon had used to manufacture his mosaic pre-cast tiles.

Later, de Leon learned that Aquino had engraved a similar mold for co-defendant Aguas who manufactured mosaic tiles with the use of said mold. Thus, de Leon filed an injunction suit against Aguas and Aquino for the protection of his patent rights with damages.

The novel features of De Leon's tile were its thinness (1/8 of an inch at its thinness); the ideal composition of cement and fine river sand making it tough and durable although thin and light; the engraving of deep designs which rendered the tile artistically pleasing and suitable for wall ornamentation, and the fact that it could easily be mass produced and stacked with only an acceptable number of breakages.

In essence, De Leon's tile represented a solution to problems of thickness, weight, aesthetics, and durability encountered by conventional pre-cast tiles.

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Aguas, fully aware of the patent in De Leon's favor, apparently found De Leon's invention to be so well-suited to his purposes that he instructed the engraver Aquino to make him a similar mode with which he manufactured his own, similar, tiles.

In their defense, Aguas and Aquino assailed De Leon's patent alleging that the invention was neither inventive nor new.

In finding for De Leon, the Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeals when it said: "... we find that De Leon has introduced an improvement in the process of tile making which proceeds not merely from mechanical skill... and (in manner) suggestive of discovery and inventiveness.

"While it is true that the (particular improvements introduced by De Leon in his invention) are known to some sculptors, still, to be able to produce a new and useful wall tile (for a new purpose), by using them all together amounts to an invention."

With regard to the invention's industrial applicability, the Court took note

of the fact that conventional pre-cast tiles were almost exclusively used for flooring although they could have been used for walling purposes. This, the Court found, was because conventional tiles were much too massive and heavy for laying other than horizontally. De Leon's tiles, on the other hand, were light enough to use for wall ornamentation, and as a consequence, attracted many buyers. As the Court said, "By using his improved process, De Leon has succeeded in producing a new product. The commercial success (of this product) is evidence of its patentability."

Comment. The De Leon tile exhibited to the Court's satisfaction, the three requirements for patentability. It was novel, the likes of which never having been produced before. It was inventive in that it went beyond the province of the artisan's mechanical skill and into the realm of inventiveness where those skills were successfully applied in ways not before tried. Its industrial applicability or usefulness was, as the Court stated, indubitably proven by huge public demand.

These matters had to be dealt with by the Court before it could proceed to the determination of the

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fact of infringement. If it had been proven that the De Leon tile was, as Aguas claimed, neither new nor inventive, the patent upon which De Leon relied for the protection of his rights would have been rendered null and there would no longer be any need to go into the question of infringement. As has been said, there can be no protection for what does not exist to be protected. Without novelty, inventiveness or industrial applicability, a contrivance simply cannot be exclusively claimed by anyone - even one who claims to be its inventor.

In case more than one inventor lays claim to the invention, who has the better right to the patent?

Under our old law, the "first-to-invent" system operated as a safety net for inventors who, for some reason or another, failed to bring his brainchild under the protective mantle letters patent.

Case in point: *Creser Precision Systems, Inc. v. CA and Floro International Corp.* (GRNo. 118708. February 2, 1998).

In this case, the private respondent, Floro, is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture, production, distribution, and sale of military armaments, munitions, and other similar materials.

When Floro discovered

that Creser had submitted Floro's patented aerial fuze - a detonating devise for setting off the explosive charge in projectiles or bombs — to the Armed Forces of the Philippines for testing, it immediately moved to protect its rights as patentee. Floro sent a letter to Creser advising it of the existence of a patent over the fuze and demanding that it cancel the scheduled testing.

In response to Floro's demand, Creser filed an injunction suit alleging infringement of its rights as "first, true and actual inventor" of the fuze. Creser admitted that it did not hold the patent for the fuze, and claimed that while such lack prevented it from suing another for infringement of patent, it did not foreclose the possibility of injunctive or declaratory relief recognized under American patent laws.

Resolving the case, the Supreme Court said, anyone who has no patent over an invention but claims to have a right or interest thereto cannot file an action for declaratory judgement or injunctive suit. He can, however, file a petition for can-

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cellation of the patent within three years from the publication of said patent and raise as ground therefor that the person to whom the patent was issued is not the true and actual inventor. The patentee, the Court said, has in its favor not only the presumption of validity of its patent, but that of a legal and factual first and true inventor of the invention.

"The onus probandi forms the theoretical and procedural bases for the determination of whether there was indeed an infringement."

Comment. Even a cursory reading of the judgement of the Court reveals that the presumption created by the patent is merely rebuttable and can be overthrown by evidence that proves, among other things:

- a) That what is claimed as the invention is not new or patentable;
- b) That the patent does not disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried out by any person skilled in the art;

- c) That the patent is contrary to public order or morality; or
- d) That the person to whom that patent was issued was not the true and actual inventor.

Also revealed is the fact that if Creser had filed the appropriate action, i.e., an action for the cancellation of Floro's patent as suggested by the Court, the dispute between the two claimants would not have been so easily resolved, that in fact, Floro might have ended up losing the patent.

This is not to say that I think one party is on higher moral ground than the other -I really would not know if Creser Precision does have a better right than Floro. The Supreme Court didn't even touch that issue, preferring instead to rule on the basis of the presumption given rise to by the patent.

Under the IPC, as under the old law, the holder of the patent is also presumed to be the first, true and actual inventor. The significant difference lies in the fact that under the IPC the presumption can no longer be attacked by allegations that the patent holder is not the true inventor. The presumption remains rebuttable, but only on the grounds that what is claimed as the invention is not new or patentable; that the patent does not disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried out by any person skilled in the art; and

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that the patent is contrary to public order or morality. The last ground under the old law, that the person to whom the patent was issued was not the true and actual inventor, has been stricken.

Thus, the first person to file his application now gets the patent, and the question of whether or not he really is the brain behind the invention fades into significance.

The remaining three other grounds for the cancellation of patents, i.e., that the invention is not new and patentable; that the patent does not disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried out by any person skilled in the art; and that the patent is contrary to public order or morality, are largely self-evident.

However, a little confusion may arise with regard to the second ground: disclosure. Intuitively, this would seem contradictory to the very purpose of the patent, i.e., to ensure the exclusivity of the patented process or artifice in such a way that only the patent-holder and his, his presumably *trusted*, assigns can produce the invention.

Our Supreme Court, in the case of *James Howard Boothe v. The Director of Patents* (GR No. L-24919, January 28, 1980) took the time to clarify the disclosure requirement. Petitioners Boothe and

Morton, attempting to take full advantage of the reci-

procity clause of RA 165, filed an application for Letters Patent, for a new antibiotic called "tetracycline," with the respondent Director on March 5, 1954.

Under that provision, the petitioners would have been entitled to the priority date of March 16, 1953 if their application was indeed considered filed on the 5th of March 1953. This was so because the law provided that an application filed in the Philippines within one year from the filing of the same application in a foreign country, which accorded reciprocal rights, would be considered to have been filed here as of the date of the foreign application.

Unfortunately, the petitioner's application was found to be deficient as it did not contain the complete specifications of the invention sought to be patented, as required by the law then in force - RA 165 and the Rules of Practice in Patent Cases.

Petitioners insisted that, although they were able to complete the specifications only on the, 22nd of July 1963, they should still have been granted priority rights

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simply because the actual - physical - filing of the application was accomplished on the 5th day of March 1953, well within the deadline set by RA 165.

The Court found no merit in the contention of the petitioners.

In the *ponencia*, the Supreme Court clarified that the completeness of the specifications of the invention was an essential element in determining the actual filing date of the application.

It said that the purpose of requiring a definite and accurate description of the process is to "appraise the public of what the patentee claims as his invention, to inform the Courts as to what they are called upon to construe, and to convey to competing manufacturers and dealers information of exactly what they are bound to avoid."

Should the disclosure be incomplete, the defect will be deemed one of substance and not merely of form. The completion of the disclosure, as the Court held, operates to fix the filing date of the application for the purpose of determining the period of protection.

Comment. In a very real sense, the disclosure requirement acts as a preemptive measure against the possibility of future infringement. In another, equally significant sense, the disclosure of the workings of the invention allows the Patent Office to critically examine the invention and determine whether it meets the essential criteria which would qualify it for patent protection.

HAS THERE BEEN AN INFRINGEMENT?

Before we can even begin discussing infringement, a corollary matter must first be clarified: the question of *who bears the burden of proof?*

Who bears the Burden of Proof?

The *onus probandi*, more than anything, forms the theoretical and procedural bases for the determination of whether there was indeed an infringement inasmuch as it defines the responsibilities of the parties to the prosecution and sets out what is expected of them. Failure to live up to those responsibilities, more often than not, brings defeat.

In *Rosario C. Maguan v. Court of Appeals and Susana Luchan* (GR N. L-45101. November 28, 1996), the Court declared that the burden of proof to substantiate the charge of infringement is with the plaintiff, i.e., the person who alleges the violation. However, "(w)here the plaintiff in-

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roduces the patent in evidence, and the same is in due form, there is created a *prima facie* presumption of its correctness and validity. The burden of going forward with the evidence (burden of evidence) then shifts to the defendant to overcome, by competent evidence, this legal presumption.

Some 11 years later, during which time the burden of proof remained on the shoulders of the plaintiff alleging infringement, this rule of evidence came under closer scrutiny in light of the TRIPs Agreement.

Under Article 34 of the TRIPs it is provided that a WTO member - and the Philippines *is* such - is required to provide a rule of disputable presumption that a product shown to be identical to one produced with a use of a patented process shall be deemed to have been obtained by the illegal use of said patented process under certain conditions.

The burden of proof then, apparently, shifted to the shoulders of the alleged infringer to show that he had not used the patented process in producing his product. Because of this change, among other grounds, the Constitutionality of the Philippines' acquiescence of the TRIPs was challenged in the case of *Wigberto E. Tanada et al. v. Edgardo A ngara et al.* (GR No. 118295. May 2, 1997). In *Tanada*, the issue was

raised that the provisions of the TRIPs unduly impaired or interfered with the exercise of judicial power, by the Supreme Court, in promulgating rules of evidence.

Resolving the question, the High Tribunal said "The burden of proof contemplated by Article 34 (of the TRIPs Agreement) should actually be understood as the duty of the alleged patent infringer to overthrow such presumption. Such burden, the Court stressed, "actually refers to the 'burden of evidence' (burden of going forward) placed on the producer of the identical (or fake) product to show that his product was produced without the use of the patented process.

"The foregoing notwithstanding," the *ponencia* continues, "the patent owner still has the burden of proof since, regardless of the presumption provided under Article 34, such owner still has to introduce evidence of the existence of the alleged identical product, the fact that it is 'identical' to the genuine one produced by the patented process and the fact of 'newness' of the genuine product or he fact of 'sub-

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stantial likelihood" that the identical product was made by the patented process."

Comment. The Intellectual Property Code, signed into law after the promulgation of the judgement in *Tanada*, embraced the requirement set by the TRIPs Agreement.

Article 34 - Process Patents: Burden of Proof of the TRIPs provides:

1. For the purposes of civil proceedings in respect of the infringement of the rights of the owner referred to in paragraph 1(b) of Article 28, if the subject matter of the patent is a process for obtaining a product, the judicial authorities shall have the authority to order the defendant to prove that the process to obtain an identical product is different from the patented process. Therefore, Members shall provide, in at least one of the following circumstances, that any identical product when produced without the consent of the patent owner shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be deemed to have been obtained by the patented process:

- (a) if the product obtained by the patented process is new;
- (b) if there is a substan-

tial likelihood that the identical product was made by the process and the owner of the patent has been unable through reasonable efforts to determine the process actually used.

2. Any Member shall be free to provide that the burden of proof indicated in paragraph 1 shall be on the alleged infringer only if the condition referred to in subparagraph (a) is fulfilled or only if the condition referred to in subparagraph (b) is fulfilled.

3. In the adduction of proof to the contrary, the legitimate interests of defendants in protecting their manufacturing and business secrets shall be taken into account.

Consequently, Section 78 of our Intellectual Property Code now reads:

"If the subject matter of a patent is a process for obtaining a product, any identical product shall be presumed to have been obtained through the use of the patented process if the product is new or there is substantial likelihood that the identical product was made by the process and the owner of the patent has been unable de-

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spite reasonable efforts, to determine the process actually used."

The tests of infringement

As adverted to earlier, there are two determinative tests of the fact of infringement: the literal infringement test, and the doctrine of equivalents.

In an early case, *Carlos Gsell v. valeriano Veloso Yap-Jue* (GR No. 4720. January 19, 1909), the Supreme Court took the opportunity to discuss the doctrine of equivalents. In this case, the Petitioner Gsell, had previously secured a decree of permanent injunction against the respondent, Yap-Jue prohibiting the latter from infringing upon Gsell's patented process for manufacturing curved cane handles for walking sticks, parasols, and umbrellas.

The injunction described the process as involving the use of a lamp or blowpipe fed with petroleum or mineral oil. The heat generated thereby was necessary to make the canes pliable enough that they could be worked into the desired curvature.

After the injunction issued, however, Yap-Jue continued to use substantially

the same procedure patented by Gsell, with the exception of the use of a lamp fueled by alcohol instead of petroleum or mineral oil.

Thus, the issue arose, of whether the respondent infringed upon the petitioner's patent in spite of the fact that he used an alcohol lamp where the patented process specifically required a lamp or blowpipe fueled differ-

"There are two determinative tests of the fact of infringement: the literal infringement test, and the doctrine of equivalents."

ently. In other words, Yap-Jue contended that because he had used a different ingredient, he could not be said to have infringed on the patent.

The Court ruled otherwise. It held that a "patentee may substitute another ingredient for anyone of the ingredients of his invention, if the ingredient substituted performs the same function as the one omitted and was

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well known at the date of his patent as a proper substitute for the one omitted in the patented combination.

"Unessential changes which do not affect the principle used in the patent process, or the mode of application authorized by the patent, are not sufficient to support the contention that the process in one case is in any essential particular different from that used in the other.

"Thus, an alteration in a patented combination which merely substitute another old ingredients in the patented combination, is an infringement of the patent."

Comment. This was the earliest appearance of the doctrine of equivalents in this jurisdiction. Years later, in 1993, the Supreme Court once again found itself having to elucidate on the doctrine of equivalents, but this time, vis-a-vis another test of infringement.

In *Pascual Godines v. Court of Appeals* (G.R. No. 97343, September 12, 1993), the Supreme Court Definitely set out the two tests for infringement.

Involved in this case is a farm implement - a power tiller - covered by a Letters Patent in the name of SV-

Agro Industries Enterprises. Subsequently, however, SV-Agro sales declined by 50%. Upon investigation of the precipitous drop, it was discovered that petitioner Godines was manufacturing similar farm implements and selling them. SV-Agro demanded that Godines stop making and selling power-tillers similar to the SV-Agro's. Godines refused to comply and was hied off to Court as an infringer.

The trial court came to the conclusion that Godines had, in manufacturing his own power-tiller, merely copied SV-Agro 's patented tiller, and so found him culpable for infringement.

The Supreme Court, in affirming the judgment against Godines held:

"Tests have been established to determine infringement. These are (a) literal infringement; and (b) the doctrine of equivalents. In using literal infringement as a test, '...resort must be had, in the first instance, to the words of the claim. If (the infringing article) clearly falls within the claim, infringement is made out and that is the end of it." To determine whether the particular item falls

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within the literal meaning of the patent claims, the Court must juxtapose the claims of the patent and the accused product within the overall context of the claims and specifications, to determine whether there is exact identity of all material elements... The patent issued by the Patent Office referred to a 'farm implement but more particularly to a turtle hand tractor having a vacuumatic housing float on which the engine drive is held in place, the operating handle, the harrow housing with its operating handle and the paddy wheel protective covering.' It appears from the observation of the trial court that these claims of the patent and the features of the patented utility model were copied by petitioner. We are compelled to arrive at no other conclusion but that there was infringement... Recognizing that the logical fallback position of one in the place of defendant is to aver that his product is different from the patented one, courts have adopted the doctrine of equivalents which recognizes that minor modifications in a patented invention are sufficient to

put the item beyond the scope of literal infringement. Thus, according to this doctrine, '(a)n infringement also occurs when a device appropriates a prior invention by incorporating its innovative concept and, albeit with some modification and change, performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to achieve substantially the same result.' The reason for the doctrine of equivalents is that to permit the imitation of a patented invention which does not copy any literal detail would be to convert the protection of the patent grant into a hollow and useless thing. Such imitation would leave room for - indeed encourage - the unscrupulous copyist to make unimportant and insubstantial changes and substitutions in the patent which, though adding nothing, would be enough to take the copied matter outside the claim, and hence outside the reach of the law."

SUMMARY

I have discussed some of the most salient aspects of patents infringement. I have tried to take you step by step through the infrastruc-

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ture of infringement prosecution, from the point where the primary answer sought is with regard to the validity of the patent, up to the actual determination of the occurrence of infringement. The case studies presented reflect the way the Supreme Court has dealt with these matters over the years, and from that basis, I am confident that we will know what to do, and where we will stand in the future. In other words, although the cases available for study so far were decided under a law already inoperative, the foundations for the decisions in those cases remain sound enough for us to predict what the Courts will do under the aegis of any new law yet to come. We need that element of predictability to guide our steps through the minefield of patents.

CONCLUSION

The field of patents has never been one of the more active areas in Philippine jurisprudence. With the in-rushing tide of globalization, I imagine that will change. And yet, even then, I do not foresee as much activity in patents as in trademarks and copyrights. Even today, our streets are covered with merchandise easily recognizable as any one of a number of foreign cartoon characters. They do brisk business, and certainly none of them have been sanctioned by the trademark

or copyright owners.

Patents, on the other hand, and the infringements thereof, are less visible. Most of the time, consumers don't really make the effort to find out who made what, or who made it first, or whatever. Yet in spite of that, in a country renowned for the derivative adaptability of its local artisans and manufacturers - the big international players on their way over to play in our yard - the current dearth of patents cases will not last for very long.

As intimately connected as I am to the administration of justice in this country, it would, perhaps, be more than understandable that I would wish things to remain as they are. Infringement of intellectual property rights, be they patents or otherwise, only works mischief. We can not tolerate that, nor afford the cost in economic damage.

We know who the enemies are: Intellectual bandits. This afternoon, I have tried to introduce you to the means we employ to combat these thieves. I trust some questions have been left unanswered, and certainly new ones have arisen. I hope that before this conference is over, we can all have the answers we need and the tools to find answers to as yet unforeseen questions ourselves.