

**WHO BELIEVES IN HUMAN RIGHTS?
Reflections on the European Convention**

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Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Pp. xxvii, 310

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This book evaluates classical perspectives of what human rights are. What can be found amidst the capacious jurisprudence of European Court of Human rights case law is an archetype. The disparity of the anarchic view on the essence of human rights is pitted against the standard, enunciated by the European Court. This comparison is clearly put out to serve as the starting point of the reader's journey to discover its very own concept of human rights.

The book posits that society in general consider human rights to be significant when they are easily grasped. This line of reasoning is brought about by giving the starting point from whence human rights are born. As opposed to what most people think, the genesis is a far cry from politics. It is true that politics is similar to human rights. However, it also goes to say that the mere fact that politics is frequently used as the contrast to human rights does not evince that such is the only way to describe human rights. The author articulates this variation constantly as an explicit emphasis between the two.

From human rights' origin, the book moves to its dissertation. The focal point of the discussion is the proposition that human rights do not merely constitute an article of faith, but they are characterized by collectivity and universality. They are collective in the sense that they are prevailing in the four corners of the world. Human rights, being universal as well, entail a notion that its designation is common all throughout. As an article of faith, human rights are palpable, incontrovertible and absolute. They are evident and imbedded in society; they cannot be denied. Despite this universal and immutable nature however, the concept of human rights vastly varies among different persons, countries and more so among different

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continents. This *cul-de-sac* of a soliloquy could have ended the entire discourse of who believes in human rights, but the author extends that very parody to provide a framework wherein the reader can ascertain just what human right is. The book subsequently comes to a supposition, that upon the authority of one's definition of human rights, such may brook about against the very paradox of the non-universal stature of the so-called universal human rights. This ability of human rights to countenance this apparent anomaly of contradiction can be adjudged accurately and appropriately through the progressive annals of society which is history. And it is in history wherein four notable human rights schools are caught sight of. These four human rights schools propose that people alternatively perceive human rights as that which is given, that which is agreed upon, that which is fought for and that which is talked about. As so aptly put by the author, "Which of these concepts we adopt is determined by particular ways in which we believe, or do not believe, in human rights."

So how does one believe or not believe in human rights? To answer the question of how to believe or not believe in human rights lie in the pieces of evidence of those very beliefs. Those pieces must first be considered. They can be augmented or weakened by another belief that is equally true. The truthfulness of the supplement of such belief depends on perception. For example there are two persons looking at the same crystal ball. The first person is looking at it and discerns it to be blue. The first person sees this no matter how he looks at the crystal ball. The second person looking through the same crystal ball sees it as a different color; green. Each of these persons perceiving is justified for claiming that what they perceive is true. The proper conclusion garnered from this example is to say that either of them may know that the crystal ball is blue or green, or that neither of them is correct. There in turn would be a reasonable doubt as to who is immersed in truth. To be able to attain as to whose perception is true, one would need an intermediary to tell them who is correct and who is wrong.

One person's belief as compared to another can be augmented or weakened by experience. These experiences provide the only evidence a person has for

believing what he deems true, and if one fails to know what he believes, as will others similarly situated. Thus, it is always possible that one's actual belief based on his experience is mistaken. As the author has stated, human rights as an article of faith, are palpable, incontrovertible and absolute. Despite this universal nature however, the concept of human rights vastly varies among different persons, countries and more so among different continents. These numerous beliefs of human rights ascribe unto the mind, wherein conformity with an idea of just what is human rights and the actual human rights occur. In this process of vast comparisons between the various beliefs as to what human rights are, one compares a belief or notion of human rights with regard to another belief or notion of human rights which shall then be compared with ones very own belief of what are human rights. A multitude comparison of beliefs then transpires. At one side, another's belief of what human rights are stands, in the other, ones belief of what human rights are stands. In this comparison of different beliefs and notions of human rights, one will find that which he will ultimately believe. How is the choice made? That which will be believed is that which most explains. Accordingly, one will believe what gives the best explanation to ones experiences. In the simplest of explanations, belief is subjective.

These associations of human rights beliefs are notions that represent ones reality and therefore constitute what one can learn from experience. Since associations stem from force of habit, they are those that what one has and are constant conjunctions and repetitions. Though such recurrences do not prove certainty, they do however give one an opportunity to rely on them. Conformity of each belief of what human rights are demands recognition, wherein despite the different notions amongst person, countries and continents, such appreciation of the conformity between them will create a universal belief of human rights. The co-existence with each human rights belief creates just what to believe in. One's mind confers, from another's notion of what human rights are, then to reality as a universal.

Formulating the essence of human rights through experience—like that which is given human rights school or that which is fought for human rights school is minimal as compared to those that are abstract—like that which is agreed upon human rights school or that which is discussed human rights school. With regard to the abstract human rights schools, our senses are of no use. A fundamental realm of easily fathomable instances governs our senses. The reason being is that however sharp these senses are, it cannot discern abstract notions of human rights for these are lofty in the sense that one who dwells in reality cannot experience anything about them. Such intricacies are abundant and as such only enable one's senses to pick up those that are seemingly feasible. The abstract concept of human rights can be surmised in the realm of the truth. One must therefore cut away the surfeit beliefs of human rights, fix up all loose ends, and toil to make his perception of what human rights are emanate from ones idea to reality. One must never stop with the process of refining, not until every single concept flourish into grandeur. When one initiates the constant refining of that belief and when one is self-gathered upon that concept, nothing can destroy that personal belief of human rights.